Walter Reed's Yellow Fever Experiments in Cuba (1900–1901)
In the summer of 1900, yellow fever was among the most feared diseases in the Americas. It could kill a large share of the people it struck, it arrived in waves that emptied port cities, and nobody could say for certain how it spread. Many doctors believed it passed through contaminated clothing, bedding, and other objects touched by the sick. The U.S. Army, which had occupied Cuba after the Spanish-American War of 1898, was losing soldiers to it.
Within about a year, a four-man Army board led by Major Walter Reed had answered the central question. Yellow fever was carried by a mosquito, now called Aedes aegypti, and not by soiled objects. Within months of that finding, mosquito control in Havana had sharply cut the number of cases in a city where the disease had been entrenched for generations.
The experiments that produced this result were done on human beings, because no animal model for yellow fever was known. One of the commission's own members died. Several volunteers became seriously ill. A nurse died in follow-up experiments the next year. The commission also used written consent agreements that historians now regard as some of the earliest of their kind. This article covers what was done, what was found, who paid the price, and how the ethics of the work look in the light of what came later.
The disease: what yellow fever does
Yellow fever is caused by a virus, although nobody knew that in 1900. After a mosquito bite, an infected person may develop fever, headache, muscle pain, and nausea. Many recover after this first phase. A portion of patients enter a second, toxic phase with high fever, liver damage causing jaundice (the yellowing that gives the disease its name), bleeding, and kidney failure. A large share of patients who reach that toxic phase die.
For the biology of the virus itself, see our explainer on the yellow fever virus.
Yellow fever repeatedly struck port cities in the Caribbean, South America, and the United States in the 18th and 19th centuries, including a major epidemic in Philadelphia in 1793 and devastating outbreaks in New Orleans and Memphis in the 1800s. Because it often followed shipping routes and appeared in crowded, unsanitary settings, many physicians concluded it spread through filth and contact with infected materials. That conclusion turned out to be wrong, and the reason it was wrong is a lesson about confusing correlation with cause.
Carlos Finlay's mosquito theory
The idea that mosquitoes carried yellow fever did not originate with Reed. In 1881, the Cuban physician Carlos Juan Finlay proposed that a mosquito, then called Culex fasciatus and now known as Aedes aegypti, transmitted the disease. Finlay presented his theory to an international sanitary conference in Washington and to the Havana Academy of Sciences in 1881, and he spent nearly two decades trying to prove it.
Finlay performed many experimental inoculations, letting mosquitoes that had fed on yellow fever patients bite volunteers. His results did not persuade the medical world. In hindsight, the main reason was timing. Neither Finlay nor anyone else then knew that the virus needs a period of development inside the mosquito, roughly one to two weeks at warm temperatures, before the insect can transmit it. Mosquitoes allowed to bite too soon after feeding on a patient would not pass on the disease. Without knowing about this incubation period, experiments gave inconsistent results.
A key clue came from Henry Rose Carter, a U.S. Marine Hospital Service physician, who studied outbreaks in Mississippi in 1898. Carter observed that after the first case appeared in a household, there was a gap of roughly two weeks before secondary cases appeared. This "extrinsic incubation period" suggested the disease had to pass through some intermediate stage outside the human body. Carter's observation helped the Reed commission design experiments that worked where earlier ones had failed.
The commission is formed
In May 1900, the U.S. Army Surgeon General, George Sternberg, created a board to investigate infectious diseases in Cuba, with a focus on yellow fever. Its members were:
- Major Walter Reed, an Army surgeon and bacteriologist, as chair
- James Carroll, a contract surgeon and Reed's longtime laboratory assistant
- Jesse Lazear, a contract surgeon who had studied at Johns Hopkins and worked at its hospital, with experience studying mosquitoes and malaria
- Aristides Agramonte, a Cuban-born Army contract surgeon and pathologist who was believed to be immune to yellow fever after childhood exposure
The commission's first task was to test a popular claim that a bacterium, Bacillus icteroides, caused yellow fever. Their investigations did not support it.
Reed then met with Finlay, who gave the commission mosquito eggs and shared his methods. The board decided to test Finlay's theory directly in human volunteers, since no laboratory animal was then known to catch yellow fever.
The first infections and Lazear's death
In August 1900, while Reed was temporarily away in the United States, Lazear began allowing mosquitoes that had fed on yellow fever patients to bite volunteers.
On August 27, 1900, James Carroll allowed himself to be bitten by a mosquito that had fed on yellow fever patients about 12 days earlier. Carroll developed a severe case of yellow fever. He survived, though his health was affected for years. A soldier, Private William Dean, was bitten a few days later by an infected mosquito and also developed yellow fever and recovered.
In September, Lazear himself developed yellow fever after a mosquito bite. Early accounts described the bite as an accident while he was working in a hospital ward, but a notebook of Lazear's, examined by the researcher Philip Hench in 1947, led many historians to conclude that he had deliberately allowed an infected mosquito to bite him, and the question is still debated. What is certain is that Jesse Lazear died of yellow fever on September 25, 1900, at the age of 34. He left a wife, Mabel, and two young children.
These cases strongly suggested mosquito transmission, but they had weaknesses as evidence. The subjects had been moving around Havana and its surroundings, where yellow fever was present, so they might have caught it some other way. Reed wanted a controlled demonstration that could not be explained away.
In October 1900, Reed presented "The Etiology of Yellow Fever: A Preliminary Note" to the American Public Health Association meeting in Indianapolis, laying out the early evidence for mosquito transmission.
Camp Lazear: designing a controlled experiment
To produce conclusive evidence, the commission set up an isolated experimental station near Quemados, outside Havana, in November 1900. They named it Camp Lazear in honor of their dead colleague. The camp was quarantined, its residents' health was monitored, and new arrivals were held for a period to make sure they were not already incubating the disease.
The design targeted two competing hypotheses at once.
The infected clothing building (testing fomites)
Fomites are objects, such as clothing, bedding, or utensils, that can carry infectious agents from one person to another. The fomite theory was the main rival to the mosquito theory.
The commission built a small, poorly ventilated building and filled it with sheets, pillows, blankets, and clothing soiled with the vomit, blood, and other discharges of yellow fever patients. Volunteers unpacked and handled these items and slept in the soiled bedding for many nights in a row, in a setting designed to give any infection in the materials every chance to spread. The building was screened to keep mosquitoes out.
None of the volunteers in this building contracted yellow fever. The experiment was repeated with different groups and the result held.
The mosquito building
A second building was clean, well ventilated, and disinfected. It was divided by a wire-mesh screen into two rooms. Infected mosquitoes were released into one side, and a volunteer entered that side and was bitten. Volunteers on the other side of the screen, breathing the same air and sharing the same building but protected from the insects, served as controls.
The volunteer exposed to mosquitoes developed yellow fever. The controls did not.
Other tests
The commission also injected small amounts of blood taken from patients in the early phase of the disease into volunteers, and some of them developed yellow fever. This showed that the infectious agent circulated in the blood early in the illness, which was consistent with a mosquito picking it up during a blood meal.
| Exposure | Mosquitoes present? | Result |
|---|---|---|
| Soiled clothing and bedding, for many nights | No (screened) | No cases of yellow fever |
| Clean room, bitten by infected mosquitoes | Yes | Yellow fever developed |
| Same building, screened from mosquitoes | No | No yellow fever |
| Injection of blood from early-stage patients | Not applicable | Yellow fever developed in some recipients |
The contrast between the two buildings separated the mosquito hypothesis from the fomite hypothesis cleanly. Disinfecting clothing, the main public health response of the day, was beside the point.
Reed presented the results, "The Etiology of Yellow Fever: An Additional Note," at the Pan-American Medical Congress in Havana in February 1901.
The volunteers
The volunteers at Camp Lazear came from two main groups.
American soldiers and staff. Some soldiers volunteered from the Army hospital corps. Two of the earliest, Private John R. Kissinger and a civilian clerk, John J. Moran, are recorded as declining the payment offered and volunteering in the interest of science and humanity. Kissinger was exposed to infected mosquitoes on December 5, 1900, developed yellow fever and survived. Moran was bitten in the mosquito building on December 21, 1900, first showed symptoms on Christmas Day, and recovered.
Spanish immigrants. Cuba in 1900 had a large population of recently arrived workers from Spain who had never been exposed to yellow fever. Many faced a high risk of catching it simply by living and working in Havana. The commission recruited some of them as paid volunteers.
None of the volunteers at Camp Lazear died. That was partly a matter of design and partly luck. The commission tried to use mosquitoes in a way they hoped would produce milder cases, and they gave patients the best supportive care available. But the risk of death was real and the commission knew it, having lost Lazear only weeks before.
The consent agreements
The most discussed feature of the Reed experiments in modern bioethics is the written consent contract that volunteers signed.
The Spanish volunteers were given two copies of the contract, one in Spanish and one in English. A surviving example is the agreement between the commission and a Spanish volunteer named Antonio Benigno, dated November 26, 1900, now held in the Philip S. Hench Walter Reed Yellow Fever Collection at the University of Virginia. According to the archive's description, the document covers minimum age requirements, the limited liability of the Yellow Fever Commission, and the amount of money volunteers would receive. Reed also sought volunteers of legal maturity and promised them the best medical care. Volunteers received $100 in gold for taking part, with an additional $100 if they contracted yellow fever. That was a substantial sum for laborers in 1900.
Historian Susan Lederer has described this consent process as a significant departure in the history of human experimentation. There was no legal requirement for consent at the time, and many researchers of the period experimented on hospital patients, prisoners, or orphans without asking. A signed document explaining the risks of a potentially fatal disease, in the subjects' own language, was unusual.
The honest limits of that consent
It would be a mistake to treat these contracts as meeting modern ethical standards. Several features would be problematic today:
- Framing of risk. The contract noted that a person living in Cuba ran the risk of catching yellow fever anyway, and that by volunteering under the commission's care the volunteer would receive the best treatment available. That framing was not false, but it encouraged volunteers to see participation as reducing a risk they already faced. A modern ethics board would look closely at whether it understated the danger of deliberate infection.
- Payment as pressure. Two hundred dollars in gold was a very large amount for recently arrived laborers. Large payments to poor subjects for high-risk research raise concerns about undue inducement, meaning that money may override a person's judgment about danger.
- No independent review. There was no ethics committee. The researchers who designed the experiment were the same people who judged whether its risks were acceptable.
- Unequal power. The researchers were officers of an occupying army. The volunteers were soldiers under military authority or poor immigrants in an occupied country. Neither group was in a strong position to say no without consequences.
The commission also had strong motives to use the consent process. Lazear's death had made the danger concrete, and the experiments on American soldiers in particular could have created a political scandal if a volunteer died without clear evidence of free agreement. Historians generally see the consent forms as both a genuine ethical step and a form of institutional self-protection. Both things can be true.
Clara Maass and the experiments that followed
The ethical stakes became painfully clear in 1901. After Reed's commission had finished its main work, the physician Juan Guiteras carried out further experiments in Havana, trying to produce mild infections that might confer immunity, a kind of crude immunization. Volunteers were again paid.
One of them was Clara Maass, a 25-year-old American contract nurse who had cared for yellow fever patients. She had been bitten by mosquitoes on several earlier occasions in 1901, and on August 14, 1901, she volunteered for another bite. She fell ill on August 18 and died on August 24, 1901. Two other volunteers in the same series, both Spanish, also died.
Public reaction in the United States to Maass's death was strong, and the experiments in Havana were halted. Maass is now honored as a symbol of nursing self-sacrifice. A hospital in New Jersey bears her name, and she was commemorated on a U.S. postage stamp in 1976.
How it fits into the history of research ethics
The Reed experiments sit at an awkward place in that history. They are often cited approvingly as an early example of written consent, and that recognition is fair. But they also involved deliberately infecting people with a disease that sometimes killed, at a time when no treatment existed.
The formal rules that now govern human research came much later and were written mostly in response to abuses. The Nuremberg Code of 1947 followed the trials of Nazi doctors. The Declaration of Helsinki came in 1964. In the United States, the exposure of the Public Health Service study at Tuskegee in 1972 led to the Belmont Report of 1979 and the modern system of institutional review boards. For that history, see our article on the Tuskegee syphilis study.
Today, deliberate infection studies, called controlled human infection or challenge trials, still take place, but under strict conditions: the disease must be treatable or self-limiting, risk must be minimized, payment must not be so large as to be coercive, and independent ethics review is mandatory. Yellow fever would not qualify, since there is still no specific antiviral cure.
What happened next: Havana and Panama
The public health payoff came fast. Major William C. Gorgas, the Army's chief sanitary officer in Havana, had been a skeptic of the mosquito theory. After the commission's findings, he organized a campaign against Aedes aegypti starting in early 1901. Inspectors screened patients so mosquitoes could not bite them, drained or covered water containers where the mosquitoes bred, and oiled standing water to kill larvae.
Because Aedes aegypti breeds in small containers of clean water around homes, such as barrels, cisterns, and flower pots, a city-wide, house-by-house campaign could hit it hard. Yellow fever cases in Havana dropped sharply in 1901, and the city was soon essentially free of the disease, which had been present there for well over a century.
Gorgas then applied the same methods to the Panama Canal Zone, where the earlier French canal effort of the 1880s had been crippled by yellow fever and malaria among its workforce. Mosquito control under Gorgas largely eliminated yellow fever from the Canal Zone by 1906, a precondition for completing the canal, which opened in 1914.
The virus and the vaccine
The Reed commission also showed something important about the nature of the infectious agent. In 1901, Reed and Carroll injected three volunteers with blood serum from a yellow fever patient that had been diluted and passed through a Berkefeld filter fine enough to hold back bacteria, and found that it could still transmit the disease. This made yellow fever the first human disease shown to be caused by what was then called a "filterable agent," what we now call a virus.
The virus itself was isolated in 1927. In the 1930s, the South African-born virologist Max Theiler, working at the Rockefeller Foundation, developed a weakened strain called 17D, which became the basis of the yellow fever vaccine. Theiler received the Nobel Prize in Physiology or Medicine in 1951 for this work. The 17D vaccine is still in use today and a single dose provides lifelong protection for most people. For the broader story of how vaccines developed, see our article on Jenner's smallpox vaccination.
Credit, controversy, and memory
The question of who deserves credit has long been contested.
Finlay's role. Finlay proposed the mosquito theory in 1881 and supplied the mosquitoes and methods. For many years, American accounts gave the bulk of credit to Reed. In Cuba, Finlay is a national hero, and Cuba marks December 3, his birthday, as Latin American Medicine Day. Most modern historians present the discovery as a confirmation of Finlay's hypothesis by Reed's commission.
Reed's role. Reed designed the decisive controlled experiments, insisted on rigorous isolation and controls, and wrote up the results with clarity. He did not personally undergo mosquito bites. Reed died in November 1902 of complications after surgery for appendicitis, at age 51. The Walter Reed Army Medical Center, later merged into the Walter Reed National Military Medical Center in Bethesda, Maryland, is named for him.
Carroll and Lazear. Carroll survived his infection but suffered health problems afterward. Lazear's death was the commission's most direct human cost.
The volunteers. On February 28, 1929, Congress passed an act (Public Law 70-858) recognizing "the high public service rendered" by Reed and those who served as voluntary subjects in the yellow fever investigations in Cuba. It established a Yellow Fever Roll of Honor, originally about two dozen names (a 1929 JAMA report counted 22 military members), to be published annually in the Army Register. Gold medals were awarded, posthumously to representatives of those who had died, and a pension of $125 a month went to the living members and to the widow of one soldier. The Spanish immigrant volunteers, who bore much of the risk, were long less visible in popular accounts than the American soldiers.
Common misconceptions
"Walter Reed discovered that mosquitoes spread yellow fever." Finlay proposed it in 1881. Reed's commission demonstrated it with controlled experiments in 1900–1901.
"Reed let himself be bitten to prove the theory." He did not. Carroll and Lazear were infected; Lazear died.
"Nobody died in the Reed experiments." No volunteer at Camp Lazear died, but commission member Jesse Lazear died after a mosquito bite during the early phase of the work, and Clara Maass and two Spanish volunteers died in the follow-up experiments of 1901 led by Guiteras.
"The consent forms make the experiments ethical by today's standards." They were an important early step, but the experiments lacked independent review, used large payments to poor subjects, and deliberately infected people with a frequently fatal, untreatable disease.
Key takeaways
- The U.S. Army Yellow Fever Commission, chaired by Walter Reed, worked in Cuba in 1900 and 1901.
- Its controlled experiments at Camp Lazear showed that Aedes aegypti mosquitoes transmit yellow fever and that soiled clothing and bedding do not.
- The work confirmed the theory proposed by Cuban physician Carlos Finlay in 1881 and built on Henry Rose Carter's observation of an incubation period.
- Commission member Jesse Lazear died of yellow fever on September 25, 1900.
- Spanish volunteers signed written consent contracts, issued in Spanish and English, and were offered $100 in gold, plus $100 more if they fell ill; some American volunteers declined payment.
- Nurse Clara Maass died in follow-up experiments in August 1901, after which human experiments in Havana stopped.
- Mosquito control by William Gorgas freed Havana and later the Panama Canal Zone of yellow fever.
Sources
- University of Virginia - Informed consent agreement between Antonio Benigno and Walter Reed
- University of Virginia Today - Walter Reed and the Scourge of Yellow Fever
- Walter Reed Medal / Yellow Fever Roll of Honor (Public Law 70-858, 1929)
- JAMA (1929) - Congress Honors the Yellow Fever Commission
- Lederer, S. E. (1995). Subjected to Science: Human Experimentation in America before the Second World War. Johns Hopkins University Press.
- AMA Journal of Ethics - The Politics of Participation: Walter Reed's Yellow Fever Experiments (2009)
- PBS American Experience - Camp Lazear
- Georgetown High School Bioethics - Walter Reed case
- Britannica - Clara Maass
- NobelPrize.org - Max Theiler, Physiology or Medicine 1951
- CDC - Yellow Fever
FAQ
Q: What did Walter Reed's yellow fever experiments prove?
A: They showed that yellow fever is transmitted by the bite of the Aedes aegypti mosquito and not by contact with clothing, bedding, or other objects used by patients. They also showed that the infectious agent circulates in the blood early in the illness.
Q: Did Walter Reed discover the mosquito theory of yellow fever?
A: No. Cuban physician Carlos Finlay proposed it in 1881. Reed's commission designed the controlled experiments that demonstrated it in 1900 and 1901, using mosquitoes and methods Finlay shared with them.
Q: Who died in the yellow fever experiments?
A: Jesse Lazear, a member of the commission, died on September 25, 1900, after a mosquito bite. No volunteer died at Camp Lazear. In 1901, nurse Clara Maass and two Spanish volunteers died in separate follow-up experiments led by Juan Guiteras in Havana.
Q: Were the volunteers paid?
A: Many were. The written contract offered $100 in gold for participation and another $100 if the volunteer contracted yellow fever. Some Americans, including Private John Kissinger and the civilian clerk John Moran, are recorded as declining payment.
Q: Was the Reed consent form the first informed consent?
A: It is often described as one of the earliest known written consent documents in human research. It was issued in Spanish and English and stated that the volunteer risked his life. It does not meet modern standards, because it lacked independent review and offered large payments to poor subjects.
Q: How did the experiments change public health?
A: Within months, William Gorgas used the findings to run a mosquito control campaign in Havana that largely eliminated yellow fever there. He later applied the same methods in the Panama Canal Zone, which made completion of the canal possible.
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About the Author
SciHub101 is an independent science and technology publication founded and edited by Buğra Sözeri, a software engineer and app developer based in Türkiye. AI tools assist with drafting and research. Source documentation in the existing archive is uneven, and articles are being reviewed and corrected. The Editorial Team byline identifies editorial responsibility; it does not certify specialist or independent human review. Where we compare products, anything built by our own team is labelled as such — see the editorial guidelines and About page for how corrections and disclosures work.
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