Countries with the Highest Birth Rates (2025 Ranked)

Birth rates are the slowest-moving force in human affairs and the most consequential. A country's fertility rate today determines its workforce in 2040, its pension burden in 2060, and its geopolitical weight in 2100. The world is currently divided more sharply by fertility than at any point in recorded history: countries at 5 to 6 children per woman will roughly triple their populations by 2100 while countries at 0.7 to 1.2 will see their populations halve. Understanding why this divide exists — and what closes it — is among the most important questions in development economics.

How this ranking is measured

Total Fertility Rate (TFR) — the primary measure in this article — is the average number of children a woman would have over her lifetime if current age-specific birth rates remained constant. It is not an actual count of children born to any individual woman; it is a period measure calculated from birth registration data, surveys, and population projections.

Key thresholds:

Replacement rate: 2.1 children per woman — the TFR at which a population neither grows nor shrinks over the long run (the 0.1 above 2.0 accounts for child mortality before reproductive age). Countries above 2.1 grow without immigration; countries below shrink without it.

Demographic dividend window — the period when a country has a large working-age population relative to dependents (young children and elderly), typically occurring during the fertility transition. This window enabled the economic growth of South Korea, Taiwan, Singapore, and Japan in the 1970s–90s.

Completed fertility rate — the actual average number of children born to women who have finished their reproductive lives. More retrospectively accurate than TFR but less useful for projections.

All data in this article draws from the UN World Population Prospects 2024 unless otherwise noted.

Source: United Nations Department of Economic and Social Affairs, Population Division, "World Population Prospects 2024: Summary of Results," 2024.

Why Sub-Saharan Africa dominates high fertility rankings

The striking dominance of Sub-Saharan African countries at the top of the global fertility rankings reflects not a single factor but a self-reinforcing system of structural conditions. Female secondary school completion rates below 20% mean girls leave school early, marry young, and have limited knowledge of contraception. Child mortality rates of 100+ per 1,000 live births create an incentive structure where parents rationally have more children as insurance against losing some to disease. Limited access to modern contraception (16% in Niger) means even women who want smaller families cannot easily achieve them. Agrarian economies where children provide labour and old-age security create economic incentives for large families that do not exist in urban cash economies. The notable absence of any high-fertility countries outside Sub-Saharan Africa (except Afghanistan and a handful of others) indicates this pattern is not universal but rather reflects a specific bundle of poverty, limited female education, high child mortality, and agrarian economic structure that characterises much of Sub-Saharan Africa and parts of South Asia.

This pattern also explains why fertility decline can be rapid where conditions change: Bangladesh reduced its TFR from 6.9 to 2.1 in one generation through female education and health worker networks, demonstrating that high fertility is not permanent without supporting structural conditions.

Where this data comes from

All birth rate and fertility statistics in this article come from the United Nations Department of Economic and Social Affairs, Population Division, specifically the "World Population Prospects 2024" publication, which represents the most authoritative and internationally standardised demographic data available. The UN compiles fertility data from national vital registration systems (birth certificates), household surveys, and census data from every country. For countries with incomplete birth registration, the UN uses demographic estimation methods to adjust for undercount. The Total Fertility Rate (TFR) figures reflect 2024 estimates and represent the average number of children a woman would have over her lifetime if current age-specific fertility rates remained constant. It is important to note that TFR is a period measure, not a cohort measure — it does not track actual women's lifetime fertility, but rather the hypothetical fertility of a "synthetic cohort" based on current-year rates.

Countries with the highest fertility rates

(Total Fertility Rate, UN World Population Prospects 2024)

Rank	Country	TFR	Region
1	Chad	6.03	Central Africa
2	Somalia	6.01	East Africa
3	DRC	5.98	Central Africa
4	Niger	5.9*	West Africa
5	Mali	5.9	West Africa
6	Angola	5.6	Southern Africa
7	Burkina Faso	5.2	West Africa
8	Mozambique	4.9	Southern Africa
9	Uganda	4.8	East Africa
10	Nigeria	4.7	West Africa
15	Tanzania	4.5	East Africa
20	Ethiopia	4.1	East Africa
30	Afghanistan	4.0	South Asia
40	Guatemala	2.6	Central America
50	India	2.0	South Asia
60	Egypt	2.7	North Africa
80	Mexico	1.9	Latin America
100	United States	1.6	North America
110	United Kingdom	1.5	Western Europe
120	Germany	1.4	Western Europe
130	Japan	1.2	East Asia
140	Italy	1.2	Southern Europe
150	China	1.0	East Asia
160	South Korea	0.72	East Asia

*Niger's TFR has been revised downward slightly in the 2024 WPP compared to earlier estimates, now aligning with Chad and Somalia at the top of the table.

Countries with the lowest fertility rates

Country	TFR	Context
South Korea	0.72	Lowest ever recorded for a major country in peacetime
Hong Kong SAR	0.73	Urban costs, career pressure
Macao SAR	0.68	Technically lowest; very small city-state
China (mainland)	1.0	Reversal from one-child policy era
Spain	1.1	Mediterranean fertility crisis
Italy	1.2	Lowest sustained rate in EU
Japan	1.2	Record low set in 2023
Germany	1.4	Below replacement for 50+ years
United Kingdom	1.5	Declining since 2012 peak
United States	1.6	Below replacement since 2007

Historical context: how the global fertility divide formed

Two centuries ago, fertility differences between countries were relatively modest. Most countries — rich and poor alike — had TFRs of 4 to 7, reflecting universal conditions of high child mortality, limited contraception, agricultural economies requiring child labour, and no social security systems to support parents in old age.

The fertility transition began in Western Europe in the late 19th century. France was the earliest: French fertility began declining in the late 1700s, related to inheritance laws that incentivised limiting family size. England, Germany, and Scandinavia followed in the 1870s–1890s, as industrialisation moved economic activity from farms to factories, reducing the value of children as agricultural labour, while urbanisation raised the cost of raising children in crowded housing.

The United States completed its fertility transition by the early 20th century (interrupted by the post-WWII baby boom from 1946 to 1964, which was an exception to the long-run trend rather than a reversal of it). Japan completed the transition by the 1960s. Most of Latin America and Southeast Asia completed it by the 1980s–2000s.

Sub-Saharan Africa is the last major region still in early stages of the fertility transition. The transition has begun — most Sub-Saharan countries are declining from their peaks — but the starting values were so high and the structural factors so persistent that even substantial declines leave absolute TFRs well above replacement.

Source: Livi-Bacci, M., "A Concise History of World Population," 5th edition, Wiley-Blackwell, 2012; UN Population Division, "World Fertility Report 2024."

Why Sub-Saharan Africa has the highest birth rates

Sub-Saharan Africa's high fertility is not explained by any single factor. It reflects a self-reinforcing combination of structural conditions that interact to sustain high birth rates even as individual countries develop:

Female education and autonomy — the strongest predictor. The correlation between women's educational attainment and fertility is among the strongest and most replicated relationships in demographic research. Women who complete secondary education marry later, have greater knowledge of and access to contraception, have more economic independence, and have stronger negotiating power within relationships. In countries where female secondary completion is below 20%, TFRs are almost universally above 4.0. In countries where completion exceeds 70%, TFRs are almost universally below 2.5.

In Niger, approximately 17% of girls complete secondary education. In Chad, approximately 12%. The structural factors limiting girls' education — distance to school, cost of schooling, early marriage norms, safety concerns, cultural expectations of domestic work — are directly linked to high fertility.

Child mortality as a fertility driver. Parents in high-mortality environments have more children partly as insurance against losing some. In Niger, the under-5 mortality rate is approximately 112 deaths per 1,000 live births — meaning roughly 1 in 9 children born do not reach age 5. In wealthy countries, this rate is 3 to 6 per 1,000. A mother who has lost children adjusts her reproductive behaviour; a society with high child mortality normalises larger families as a rational response. As child mortality falls — the first step in the demographic transition — birth rates typically follow within one generation, as parents learn to trust child survival.

Contraceptive access and unmet need. Modern contraceptive use in Niger is approximately 16% of women of reproductive age. The unmet need for family planning — women who report wanting to avoid or delay pregnancy but lack access to effective contraception — is enormous across the Sahel. Research by the Population Reference Bureau estimates that meeting unmet contraceptive need in Sub-Saharan Africa could reduce births by 30–40% without any change in desired family size.

Economic incentives for large families. In subsistence agricultural economies without formal social security, children perform multiple economic functions: labour in childhood and adolescence, and support for parents in old age. In urban cash economies, children are net costs from birth through adulthood. The economic calculus shifts decisively toward lower fertility as urbanisation increases. Sub-Saharan Africa is urbanising rapidly — but the majority of the population in most high-fertility countries remains rural.

Marriage age and cultural norms. Niger's girls have a median age at first marriage of approximately 15 years — the lowest in the world. Early marriage compresses the reproductive period, increases lifetime birth exposure, and typically reduces education attainment. Cultural and religious norms around family size, polygamy, and contraception vary significantly across the region but generally do not favour small families in the way that Western secular culture has come to.

Source: Population Reference Bureau, "World Population Data Sheet 2024"; UNICEF, "The State of the World's Children 2023."

Niger: the high-fertility case in detail

Niger combines every high-fertility structural factor simultaneously and at the most extreme levels. Understanding Niger as a system — not a failure but a rational response to specific conditions — illustrates the dynamics driving global fertility patterns.

Niger's current statistics (2024):

• TFR: approximately 5.9 (revised from earlier 6.7 estimates in new UN 2024 data)
• Under-5 mortality: ~112 per 1,000 live births
• Female secondary school completion: ~17%
• Modern contraceptive prevalence: ~16%
• Median age at first marriage for girls: ~15 years
• Rural population: ~83%
• Population under 15: approximately 50%
• Population doubling time at current rates: approximately 22 years

At current trajectories, Niger's population will grow from approximately 27 million today to 65–70 million by 2050. The UN's 2024 medium-variant projection has Niger potentially reaching 120+ million by 2100 — in a landlocked Sahelian country with severe water stress, desertification pressures, and food insecurity for the current population.

This is not a prediction of catastrophe; it is a description of the demographic trajectory if structural conditions do not change. The historical record shows that fertility transitions can occur rapidly once the preconditions are met — Bangladesh reduced its TFR from 6.9 in 1975 to 2.1 by 2010, one of the fastest transitions in history, driven by community health worker networks and female NGO employment. The question for Niger and similar countries is whether economic development and education investment can create equivalent conditions.

The low-fertility crisis: South Korea, Japan, and East Asia

The low-fertility cluster of South Korea (0.72), Japan (1.2), and China (1.0) represents a distinct problem from the European fertility deficit — deeper, faster-falling, and less responsive to policy.

South Korea's 0.72 TFR is the lowest ever recorded for a major country in peacetime — a figure that, sustained for a generation, would cut the population in half within 70 years. The Seoul metropolitan area has an even lower TFR, approximately 0.55. The implications are already visible in the labour market, pension system, and military:

• South Korea's working-age population (15–64) peaked in 2016 and is now contracting
• The National Pension Service projects insolvency by 2055 under current birth rate and payment assumptions
• Military recruitment shortfalls are being managed by extending service lengths and lowering physical fitness standards
• 300+ schools have closed in the past decade due to insufficient enrollment

The causes of South Korean sub-replacement fertility are distinct from European low fertility. South Korea's TFR decline correlates with:

Extreme education and career competition. South Korea's university entrance process (the suneung exam) is one of the world's most intense; preparation begins in earnest from middle school. Young Koreans spend their late teens and early twenties in intense academic competition. Establishing career stability in South Korean corporate culture — which favours long tenure at large chaebols (conglomerates) with demanding hours — takes most of the 20s. By the time young Koreans have the career and financial stability they consider necessary for family formation, they are in their late 20s or early 30s, with less reproductive time and higher opportunity costs.

Housing costs. Seoul apartment prices roughly tripled between 2015 and 2022 (before a partial correction). A family-sized apartment in Seoul's desirable school districts requires 15–20 years of median household income. Young couples delay or forgo family formation because they cannot afford appropriate housing.

Gender dynamics and workplace culture. South Korean women now complete university at higher rates than men but face significant labour market penalties after childbirth. Research by the Korea Development Institute found that South Korean women experience a 30–50% wage penalty following their first child — a "motherhood penalty" far larger than in Nordic countries (where parental leave is generous and socially normalised for both parents). Many South Korean women are choosing between career and family rather than combining them.

South Korea has spent approximately 280 trillion won ($200+ billion) on pro-natalist policies over 20 years — cash payments for births, childcare subsidies, housing preferences for families, and parental leave expansion. The TFR has continued falling. This is strong evidence that the drivers are structural — deeply embedded in labour markets, housing, and gender norms — rather than financial.

Source: Statistics Korea, "Birth Trends 2023"; Korea Development Institute, "Analysis of the Low Fertility Problem," 2023; UN World Population Prospects 2024.

Japan's 1.2 TFR and record-low birth count in 2023 (approximately 758,000 births — less than half the annual births in the baby boom peak years) represent the advanced stage of a demographic transition that began in the 1970s. Japan is already experiencing its consequences: the population peaked at 128 million around 2008 and is now declining; the elderly (65+) now represent 29% of the population, the highest proportion of any country; adult diapers outsell infant diapers; and rural depopulation is creating "akiya" (vacant homes) at a rate of 8 million+ currently standing empty.

Japan's response has focused on increasing female labour force participation (Abenomics' "womenomics" agenda), expanding childcare capacity, and encouraging immigration — historically resisted but gradually opening. The government's "new dimension of child-related policies" (2023) committed 3 trillion yen to childcare and parental leave over three years. Measurable fertility effect: minimal so far.

China's 1.0 TFR is remarkable partly because of history: China's one-child policy (1980–2015) reduced the TFR from approximately 3.0 in the late 1970s to approximately 1.7 by 2000. When the policy was relaxed (two-child policy 2016, three-child policy 2021), the expected fertility rebound did not materialise. Chinese young adults have internalised small-family norms so thoroughly, and face such acute economic pressures in urban housing and childcare, that removing the formal restriction has not reversed the trend.

The demographic dividend: what high fertility can become

The demographic transition — from high birth rates and high death rates to low birth rates and low death rates — passes through an intermediate stage that, if managed correctly, can fuel extraordinary economic growth.

As child mortality falls but before fertility fully declines, a country accumulates a bulge of young working-age people relative to dependents. This "demographic dividend" window opens when the ratio of workers to dependents is maximally favourable. East Asia's economic growth in the 1970s–90s — South Korea, Taiwan, Singapore, Japan, later China — was significantly enabled by this demographic structure. Research by David Bloom and Jeffrey Williamson (1998) estimated that demographic factors accounted for 30–40% of the "East Asian economic miracle."

Sub-Saharan Africa is potentially approaching a demographic dividend — its young, rapidly growing population could become the largest labour force in the world by mid-century. Nigeria alone is projected to have a population of 400+ million by 2100 and could be a major global economy. But the dividend only materialises if countries can educate their young populations (currently constrained by weak school systems), employ them (requiring economic diversification beyond subsistence agriculture), and keep them healthy (requiring healthcare infrastructure investment).

If these conditions are not met, the demographic dividend becomes what researchers call a "demographic time bomb" — a growing young population with insufficient education, employment, or opportunities, creating social and political instability. This is the trajectory concern for Sahel countries with the highest current TFRs and the weakest development indicators.

Source: Bloom, D.E. & Williamson, J.G., "Demographic Transitions and Economic Miracles in Emerging Asia," World Bank Economic Review, 1998; Gates Foundation, "Goalkeepers 2023 Report."

Surprises in the birth rate data

Afghanistan above replacement. Afghanistan's TFR (approximately 4.0) remains high despite two decades of conflict and the return of Taliban governance since 2021. Under-5 mortality is very high (approximately 60–70 per 1,000 live births) and female education has effectively collapsed. The structural conditions that sustain high fertility in West Africa are present in concentrated form in Afghanistan.

India's internal divide. India's national average TFR (2.0) is fractionally below replacement — but this obscures a stark north-south divide. Kerala and Tamil Nadu have TFRs of 1.5–1.7, comparable to Western Europe. Uttar Pradesh and Bihar have TFRs of 2.8–3.0, closer to the Sub-Saharan pattern. India is simultaneously completing the fertility transition in its most developed states and in the early stages in its least developed ones.

The US below replacement since 2007. The United States has not produced enough births to replace its population without immigration since 2007. This is partially obscured by immigration — the US population continues growing. But native-born American fertility has been below replacement for nearly two decades, reflecting the same housing cost, career competition, and female autonomy factors seen in European countries, albeit from a higher baseline.

Rwanda's rapid transition. Rwanda — a country associated internationally with the 1994 genocide — has reduced its TFR from approximately 8.5 in 1990 to approximately 3.8 today. This is one of the fastest fertility transitions in African history, driven by aggressive community health worker programmes, near-universal primary and secondary female education, and strong government family planning support. Rwanda demonstrates that fertility transitions can accelerate even from extreme starting points.

Migration: the bridge between demographic extremes

The fertility divide is the primary long-run driver of migration pressure. Young people born in the world's fastest-growing populations will increasingly seek opportunities in the world's fastest-shrinking labour forces.

This pattern already operates at scale: sub-Saharan African migrants to Europe, South Asian workers in Gulf states, Central American migrants to the US. These flows are economic responses to wage differentials created by demographic imbalances — labour is oversupplied in high-fertility countries and undersupplied in low-fertility ones.

By 2050, the UN projects:

• Nigeria will be the world's third-largest country by population (~400 million)
• Sub-Saharan Africa's working-age population will exceed that of China and India combined
• Europe's working-age population will have declined by 50–70 million
• Japan's population will be approximately 104 million, down from 125 million today

The mathematical implication is that either fertility recovers in low-fertility countries (historically difficult to achieve through policy), or immigration flows increase substantially, or low-fertility countries accept significant economic shrinkage. Most wealthy governments are choosing managed immigration — Canada, Australia, Germany, and the UK all explicitly use immigration to offset demographic decline. The political sustainability of that choice in an era of rising nationalist sentiment is a separate question from the demographic necessity.

Source: UN World Population Prospects 2024 medium-variant projections; Pew Research Center, "Global Attitudes Toward Migration," 2024.

Frequently asked questions

Q: Does immigration solve low birth rates? A: Partially and temporarily. Countries like Canada, Australia, and Germany use immigration to offset demographic decline and maintain working-age population ratios. This is effective at the required scale. However, immigrants to wealthy countries typically adopt local fertility patterns within one or two generations. Immigration delays demographic decline but does not reverse underlying fertility trends.

Q: Why does India's birth rate matter so much? A: India crossed 1.4 billion population in 2023, surpassing China. Its national TFR (2.0) is near replacement, but enormous internal variation means some states are growing rapidly while others are declining. India's demographic structure — a large young population entering the workforce through the 2030s — creates a potential dividend period. How India manages education, employment, and health investment for this cohort will significantly affect global economic growth.

Q: What is the demographic dividend? A: The demographic dividend is the economic growth potential created when a country transitions from high to low birth rates and temporarily has a large working-age population relative to dependents. The transition requires falling child mortality before fertility declines, creating a bulge of young workers. East Asian economies used this window to fuel 30–40 years of above-trend growth. Sub-Saharan Africa could experience a similar effect — but only if education and employment opportunities keep pace with population growth.

Q: Has any country successfully raised its birth rate through policy? A: Short-term increases are achievable. Hungary has raised its TFR from 1.25 in 2011 to approximately 1.55 in 2023 through an aggressive pro-natalist policy package (mortgage discounts for third children, lifetime income tax exemption for mothers of four or more). This is a genuine policy success. However, no country has reversed long-term structural fertility decline back above replacement through policy alone; Hungary's current 1.55 is still well below replacement despite the largest pro-natalist spending as a share of GDP of any EU country.

Q: What is the relationship between economic development and fertility? A: The demographic transition model describes a consistent pattern: as countries develop (falling child mortality, rising incomes, urbanisation, female education), fertility declines from high pre-transition levels (5–7) toward low post-transition levels (1.5–2.5). This transition has occurred in every country that has achieved sustained development. The debate is whether the lowest post-transition TFRs (0.7–1.2, seen in East Asia) are a new permanent equilibrium or a temporary "lowest low fertility" phase before stabilisation.

Q: What happens to a country's population when TFR stays at 0.72 for decades? A: South Korea's 0.72 TFR implies that each generation is roughly one-third the size of the previous one. Starting from 51 million today, sustained 0.72 TFR would project the Korean population to approximately 24 million in 2100 and continuing downward. The South Korean government considers this a national security issue and has elevated it to cabinet-level priority. Most demographers expect the TFR to stabilise somewhat above its current level as structural conditions (housing costs, work culture, childcare) are addressed — but the direction of change is not yet clearly reversed.

The takeaway

The world's birth rate divide is the starkest demographic inequality in human history, and it is widening. Chad and Somalia average 6 children per woman while South Korea averages 0.72 — a gap that will compound into massive population divergence by 2100. The structural forces sustaining high African fertility (low female education, high child mortality, limited contraception, agrarian economies) are the same forces that block economic development, creating a double bind. The forces driving East Asian fertility collapse (extreme career competition, housing unaffordability, motherhood career penalties) are the unintended consequences of highly successful development. No rich government has found a policy solution to sub-replacement fertility; no poor government has found a fast route to the fertility transition short of accelerating female education and health access. The gap between these two demographic worlds will drive the largest migration flows in human history over the next 50 years.

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