Countries with the Lowest Birth Rates (2025 Ranked)

The total fertility rate (TFR) measures the average number of children a woman is expected to have over her lifetime, based on current age-specific birth rates. To maintain a stable population without immigration, a country needs a TFR of approximately 2.1 — the "replacement level." Below that, each generation is smaller than the one before it. South Korea's TFR of 0.72 is the lowest ever reliably recorded for any country in human history: at that rate, each generation is roughly one-third the size of its predecessor, implying a population collapse within 80 years under current trends. This is not a projection — it is arithmetic applied to observed data.

How birth rates are measured

Total Fertility Rate (TFR) is the standard measure used in this article and in most demographic analysis. It represents the number of children the average woman would have over her reproductive lifetime (ages 15–49) if current age-specific birth rates held constant. It is a period measure — it describes current conditions, not actual cohort outcomes — which means it can shift rapidly as social and economic conditions change.

Crude birth rate is a simpler figure: the number of live births per 1,000 population per year. It is easier to calculate but harder to compare across countries with different age structures, so TFR is preferred for country comparisons.

Replacement rate is conventionally set at 2.1 children per woman in developed countries. The figure is higher than 2.0 because some children born will not survive to reproductive age, and because the sex ratio at birth slightly favours males. In low-mortality countries, the replacement rate may be marginally lower than 2.1; in high-mortality countries, higher.

Data sources: The figures below are drawn from the United Nations World Population Prospects 2024 and the World Bank fertility rate database, which aggregates national vital statistics. Some country-level figures (South Korea, Japan) use national statistics agency data, which may differ slightly from UN estimates.

Source: UN World Population Prospects 2024; World Bank — Fertility rate, total (births per woman), South Korea; UNFPA World Population Dashboard.

Countries with the lowest birth rates (2024)

Rank	Country	TFR (2023–24)	Population trend
1	South Korea	0.72	Declining
2	Hong Kong	0.77	Declining
3	Macau	0.86	Declining
4	Taiwan	0.87	Declining
5	Singapore	0.97	Stable (immigration)
6	China	1.00	Peak passed, now declining
7	Spain	1.16	Declining
8	Italy	1.20	Declining
9	Japan	1.20	Declining
10	Poland	1.16	Declining (emigration impact)
11	Greece	1.32	Declining
12	Germany	1.36	Stable (immigration)
13	Portugal	1.40	Declining
14	Ukraine	1.06	Declining (war-intensified)
15	Hungary	1.53	Slight recovery (policy-driven)
—	World average	2.33	Growing (decelerating)
—	Niger (highest)	6.73	Rapid growth

Source: UN World Population Prospects 2024; World Bank; National Statistics Agencies (2023-24 data).

Where this data comes from

The figures derive from the UN World Population Prospects 2024 revision, which collects vital statistics from national governments and integrates them into standardized demographic estimates. For countries with complete vital registration (most of the list), TFR is calculated directly from birth and population records. For countries with incomplete registration, the UN applies model-based estimation using DHS surveys and other household data. National statistics agencies like South Korea's and Japan's publish independent TFR figures that may differ slightly from UN estimates; their most recent official data is used here. All figures represent 2023-24 observations and reflect current conditions, not projections — TFR can shift meaningfully year-to-year as policy, economy, and cultural norms shift.

Historical context: the demographic transition

Understanding why these countries have such low birth rates requires understanding the broader process called the demographic transition — one of the most reliably observed patterns in social science.

Pre-industrial societies were characterised by high birth rates and high death rates, resulting in slow population growth. As mortality declined (through better nutrition, sanitation, and medicine), population initially grew rapidly — the phase experienced by many African and South Asian countries in the 20th century. Then, as education spread, women entered the workforce, and child-rearing costs rose, birth rates fell to match the now-low death rates. At replacement level (TFR 2.1), the transition is "complete" — a stable, ageing population with low birth and death rates.

What is historically unprecedented about the countries in this ranking is that their TFRs have fallen far below replacement level and stayed there. In the classic demographic transition theory, TFR stabilises around 2.1 as development plateaus. What South Korea, Japan, and Southern Europe show is that it does not stabilise there — it can continue falling to 0.72, 1.20, 1.16. No economic theory predicted this, and no policy has reversed it once it reaches these depths.

Think of it like a thermostat set 30 degrees too low: the feedback mechanisms that were supposed to stabilise the system at a comfortable equilibrium are not engaging. The "second demographic transition," a theory developed by demographers Dirk van de Kaan and Ron Lesthaeghe, argues that in post-industrial societies, individual self-realisation and lifestyle freedom take precedence over family formation in ways that are simply not reversed by moderate income growth or cash incentives.

Source: Macrotrends — South Korea fertility rate 1950–2025; Population Connection — UN population projections.

South Korea: the lowest in recorded human history

South Korea's TFR of 0.72 is extraordinary not just by contemporary standards but by any historical standard. No country with reliable vital statistics has recorded a sustained TFR at this level. The UN's World Population Prospects 2024 notes it as an outlier without precedent.

The mathematics: At TFR 0.72, Korea's population would halve roughly every 40 years in the absence of immigration. South Korea's current population of approximately 52 million is projected, under current trends, to fall to around 22 million by 2100 — less than half its current size.

Why it happened: No single cause explains South Korea's record-low TFR. The causes are multiple and mutually reinforcing.

Seoul is one of the world's most expensive housing markets. The standard path to home ownership — considered culturally prerequisite to marriage and family formation — requires 15–20 years of median household income. Young adults who cannot afford housing delay marriage; those who delay marriage have fewer children. This is not unique to Korea, but the severity of the housing cost burden in Korean cities is extreme.

The South Korean education system operates on a culture of relentless academic competition. Supplementary private tutoring (hagwon) is not optional but effectively mandatory for children whose parents wish them to be competitive. A 2022 government survey found Korean parents spend an average of 300,000–400,000 Korean won (approximately $220–300) per month per child on private education — on top of public school costs. One child is expensive; two is economically punishing for most households.

Korean women have achieved educational parity with men and participate in the workforce at high rates before marriage. But South Korea's workplace culture — characterised by long hours, inflexible scheduling, and significant career penalties for women after childbirth — presents a binary choice that many Korean women are making explicitly: career or children, not both. The country's gender pay gap (one of the largest in the OECD) and the persistent expectation of intensive, primary-caregiver motherhood make the career-or-children tradeoff starker than in Nordic countries where parental leave and childcare support allow both.

South Korea also has among the longest working hours in the OECD — averaging 1,915 hours per year in 2023, compared to 1,363 in Germany and 1,408 in France. A culture that demands long hours leaves little time for the domestic labour of raising children.

Government response: South Korea has spent over $200 billion on pro-natalist policies since 2006 — cash payments at birth (up to 2 million won per newborn), extended parental leave, childcare subsidies, and housing preferences for large families. The TFR has continued falling throughout this period. The 2023 figure of 0.72 was a new record low, despite the policy spending. The implication is that financial incentives are insufficient against structural and cultural forces of this magnitude.

Source: Worldometer — South Korea population; MacroMicro — Key findings from 2024 UN World Population Prospects; Population Pyramids — South Korea.

Japan: 50 years below replacement

Japan's demographic situation is the longest-running example of sustained below-replacement fertility among major economies. Japan's TFR crossed below 2.1 in 1975 — half a century ago — and has not recovered.

The super-aged society: Japan is the world's most aged population. Approximately 30% of Japanese citizens are over 65, and 10% are over 80. These proportions are the highest ever recorded for a major country and create fiscal pressures that compound every year: pension obligations increase as the cohort of retirees grows; healthcare and elder care costs rise; but the working-age population that funds these systems is shrinking.

The population peak and decline: Japan's population peaked at approximately 128 million in 2008. By 2025 it has fallen to approximately 124 million, declining by roughly 600,000–800,000 per year through natural decrease (deaths exceeding births), not emigration. Japan is losing a city the size of Kyoto every two years to demographic attrition.

The immigration decision: Japan has maintained one of the lowest immigration rates of any wealthy country — the foreign-born population is approximately 2.5% of total, compared to 15–20% in Canada, Australia, and Germany. This is a policy choice, not a geographic inevitability. Japan has, in recent years, liberalised skilled worker visa pathways, but the scale of inflow is insufficient to offset natural population decline. The decision to not rely on immigration to solve demographic decline means Japan must adapt to a genuinely smaller population — which it is doing through robotics, automation, and productivity improvements that some economists see as positive externalities of demographic pressure.

Karoshi: Japan's relationship with overwork creates a direct link between work culture and birth rates. Karoshi (death from overwork) is a legally recognised cause of death, with approximately 2,000 certified cases annually. The same long-hours culture that creates karoshi risk also leaves workers — particularly men in demanding careers — little time or energy for family formation. The correlation between working hours and low fertility is consistent across wealthy countries; Japan is its extreme example.

Source: Worldometer — South Korea population; UNFPA World Population Dashboard.

China: the policy overhang

China's current fertility crisis cannot be understood without the one-child policy (1980–2015) — the largest deliberate intervention in human reproduction in history.

The policy and its effects: Mandatory for Han Chinese in urban areas for 35 years, the one-child policy successfully limited China's population growth. But it also produced several demographic distortions that now define China's situation.

The policy preference for male children, combined with sex-selective abortion and (illegally) female infant abandonment, produced a sex ratio imbalance peaking at approximately 117 male births per 100 female births in the 2000s. This means China's current young adult cohort has tens of millions of surplus men who statistically will not marry or form families — a direct structural depressant on future birth rates.

The policy also normalised the one-child family structure so thoroughly that when restrictions were lifted — to two children in 2015, three children in 2021, no limit from 2021 — the cultural and economic logic of one-child families persisted. Chinese couples accustomed to planning a household budget around one child's education and housing costs did not simply add more children because the law permitted it.

Post-policy collapse: China's TFR has continued falling since the one-child policy ended. The current TFR of approximately 1.0 places China in the same tier as South Korea and Japan — a demographic surprise given that China's income levels are lower, and lower-income countries typically have higher fertility. The explanation is urbanisation: China has urbanised at extraordinary speed over 40 years. Urbanised Chinese families face the same high housing costs, education competition, and opportunity costs of childbearing that urban South Koreans and Japanese face.

The economic stakes: China's extraordinary GDP growth from 1980 to 2020 was partly powered by a "demographic dividend" — a large, young workforce relative to the retired population. As that workforce ages and shrinks, China faces the prospect of becoming old before it becomes rich. The United Nations projects China's population to fall from approximately 1.4 billion today to under 1 billion by 2100 under median scenarios.

Eastern and Southern Europe: emigration compounds low fertility

Italy, Spain, Greece, and Poland share a pattern that makes their demographic situations more severe than their TFRs alone suggest: low fertility compounded by net emigration of young adults.

Italy has a TFR of 1.20 and loses approximately 200,000 people per year to natural population decline. It also loses young workers — particularly graduates — to emigration to Germany, the UK, and other EU countries with better economic prospects. Italy is losing both babies and the people most likely to have them.

Poland has a TFR of 1.16 and has lost approximately 2 million people to emigration since EU accession in 2004 — primarily working-age adults in their 20s and 30s. The emigration of the highest-fertility age cohort accelerates Poland's demographic decline beyond what the TFR figure alone captures.

The emigration amplifier: This pattern — low fertility plus emigration of young adults — operates as a demographic compound interest in reverse. The young adults most likely to form families and have children are also the most mobile, the most likely to take EU free movement opportunities, and the most likely to settle permanently in higher-wage countries. Their departure both reduces current birth rates and removes future parents from the country.

Hungary's experiment: Hungary's pro-natalist programme under Viktor Orbán is the world's most aggressive: income tax exemption for women with four or more children, substantial cash grants at marriage and birth, preferential mortgage terms for families, and free fertility treatments. The programme costs approximately 5% of GDP annually — a fiscal commitment comparable to some countries' defence spending. Hungary's TFR has risen from 1.23 (2011) to 1.53 (2022), a meaningful 25% increase. But 1.53 remains far below the 2.1 replacement level, and demographers debate how much of the increase reflects genuine fertility change versus timing effects (people having children earlier in response to incentives, creating a temporary spike without changing lifetime family size).

Source: UN World Population Prospects 2024; MDPI — Probabilistic projections of South Korea's population decline.

What structural forces drive low fertility down

Research across dozens of low-fertility countries points to several consistent structural causes. These operate somewhat independently — which is why fixing one rarely reverses declining TFR.

Urban housing costs: In cities (where most economic opportunity is concentrated), housing costs relative to income have risen sharply across East Asia and Southern Europe over the past 30 years. Delaying family formation while accumulating sufficient resources is rational — but the delay compounds, as women's fertility window narrows.

Education and career opportunity for women: Higher female education and labour market participation are consistently associated with lower fertility. This is not because educated women do not want children, but because the opportunity cost of time out of the workforce is higher, and because careers require sustained investment of time. Countries that resolve this with generous parental leave and flexible work structures (the Nordic model) have higher fertility than countries where career and family remain binary choices.

Child-rearing costs: In South Korea, Japan, and Singapore, the cost of raising a child to university-educated adult — including private tutoring, supplementary schooling, and university fees — is among the highest in the world relative to median income. One child is financially manageable for many households; two requires genuine sacrifice; three or more is economically irrational for most.

Cultural norms around intensive parenting: The expectation that parenting requires intensive, constant involvement (the "intensive parenting" model) is more prevalent in East Asian countries than in Northern Europe. Countries where children are expected to be largely self-sufficient from age 10–12 have measurably less parenting burden per child than those where parents remain intensively involved through university graduation.

Frequently asked questions

Q: Can countries reverse low birth rates? A: The historical record is sobering. No country that has fallen below a TFR of 1.5 has returned to replacement level (2.1). France and Sweden, through generous family support policies maintained over decades, have sustained rates of 1.7–1.9 — the highest among wealthy low-fertility countries — but neither has reached 2.1. Hungary's rise to 1.53 is the largest policy-driven improvement on record, but it remains well below replacement. The structural causes — housing costs, career-family tradeoffs, intensive parenting expectations — are extremely difficult for policy to reverse. Cash incentives appear insufficient against forces of this magnitude.

Q: Does immigration solve the problem? A: Immigration can stabilise population size and the workforce age structure in the short to medium term. Germany, Canada, Australia, and New Zealand use immigration to maintain growing or stable populations despite below-replacement fertility. However, immigrant populations adopt the fertility rates of their destination country within one to two generations. Immigration is a demographic stabiliser, not a permanent solution — it delays the structural imbalance rather than resolving it.

Q: Why are East Asian rates so much lower than European rates? A: East Asian societies combine several particularly severe versions of the structural causes: extreme housing and education costs in dense urban environments, long working hours, strong cultural expectations of intensive parenting, limited workplace flexibility for working mothers, rapid urbanisation over a compressed timeframe, and (in South Korea and Japan) pronounced gender inequality in both the workplace and the domestic division of labour. The same economic pressures that exist in Southern Europe operate at greater intensity in Seoul, Tokyo, and Singapore.

Q: What is a TFR of 0.72 in practical terms? A: If South Korea's TFR stayed at 0.72 indefinitely and immigration remained minimal, the population would halve in approximately 40 years and decline by 75% within 80 years. A population of 52 million would theoretically fall to 13 million by 2105. The UN's median projection — which includes some immigration and some modest TFR recovery — projects South Korea's population at approximately 22 million by 2100.

Q: Is the world running out of people? A: No — globally, population is still growing. The world population reached 8 billion in 2022 and is projected to peak at approximately 10–10.4 billion around 2080–2090 before stabilising or slowly declining. The demographic problem is not global population collapse but regional imbalance: East Asia and Southern Europe are shrinking while Sub-Saharan Africa continues rapid growth. The challenge for the coming century is managing this imbalance through migration, economic development, and institutional adaptation.

The takeaway

The global demographic transition is reshaping the economic geography of the 21st century faster than most policy frameworks have adapted to. Countries with the lowest birth rates face pension system pressure, labour shortages, and economic growth headwinds that cannot be quickly resolved. The striking pattern of the past two decades is that economic development beyond a certain threshold reliably reduces fertility below replacement level — and that no policy toolkit has reliably reversed this once TFR falls below 1.5. South Korea's 0.72 is the extreme leading edge of a process affecting dozens of countries. The structural causes — housing costs, education costs, career-family tradeoffs, intensive parenting expectations — are deeply embedded in the economic and cultural fabric of modern urban societies. Addressing them requires more than cash transfers: it requires rethinking how housing markets work, how workplaces accommodate parents, and how societies distribute the costs of raising the next generation.

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